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Matthew P. Hoh (center)1 and Map of Zabul Province, 
Afghanistan2 
I fail to see the value or the worth in continued US casualties or 
expenditures of resources in support of the Afghan government in 
what is, truly, a 35-year old civil war. 
–Matthew P. Hoh, Senior Civilian Representative 
Department of State, September 10, 2009 
And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our 
vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 [US] troops to 
Afghanistan.  After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home.  
These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while 
building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible 
transition of our forces out of Afghanistan. 
–President Barack H. Obama to US Corps of Cadets 
December 1, 20093 
The year 2011 marks the tenth year of coalitional combat 
operations and troop deployments as part of Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan.  President Obama’s definitive statement on 
his “way ahead” in Afghanistan came during his December 1, 2009, 
West Point speech on the nature of our commitment in post-9/11 
Afghanistan, the scope of our interests, and the strategy to bring that 
war to a successful conclusion.4 
This Article will compare and contrast the Commander-in-Chief’s 
perspective with that of the Senior Civilian Representative of Zabul 
Province, Afghanistan, a 36-year-old career foreign service officer 
who lived the “ground truth” of (d)evolving events in Afghanistan.5  
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1 U.S. official in Afghanistan resigns over ‘unkept’ promises, PRESS TV (Nov. 1, 2009, 
01:10 PM), http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=110168&sectionid=3510304. 
2 Karen DeYoung, U.S. official resigns over Afghan war, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2009, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26 
/AR2009102603394.html. 
3 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the 
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward                
-afghanistan-and-pakistan [hereinafter Address on Afghanistan]. 
4 Id. 
5 Letter from Matthew Hoh, Senior Civilian Representative of Zabul Province, Afg., to 
Ambassador Nancy J. Powell, Dir. Gen. of the Foreign Ser. and Dir. of Human Res. (Sept. 
10, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/hp/ssi/wpc/Resignation  
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It will also consider the 2001 through present-day intervention in 
Afghanistan in light of the twenty-first anniversary of Operation 
Promote Liberty—the civil-military operations following the United 
States’ first post-Cold War intervention in the Republic of Panama, 
Operation Just Cause. 
I 
THE MATTHEW HOH RESIGNATION—AND THE OBAMA 
RESPONSE? 
The Washington Post described Hoh as “[a] former Marine Corps 
captain with combat experience in Iraq, [who] had also served in 
uniform at the Pentagon, and as a civilian in Iraq and at the State 
Department.”6  From July through September of 2009, Hoh was the 
senior U.S. civilian in Zabul province, “a Taliban hotbed,”7 only to 
become the first U.S. official to resign in protest over the Afghan war 
because he believed it “simply fueled the insurgency.”8  Reportage 
further elaborated on how the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl 
W. Eikenberry, brought Hoh to Kabul to offer him a job on his senior 
embassy staff, then Richard C. Holbrooke, the administration’s 
special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, offered Hoh a 
planning position on his staff; Hoh rejected both offers.9 
What if State Department and other White House officials had 
listened to Hoh’s critique?  We have no proof his objections factored 
into the latest Afghanistan strategy, but an interesting point-
counterpoint comparison can be made of Hoh’s resignation points and 
those of President Obama’s West Point strategy speech.  In his 
September 10, 2009, resignation, Hoh led with the notion that “[he 
failed] to see the value or the worth in continued U.S. casualties or 
expenditures of resources in support of the Afghan government in 
what is, truly, a 35-year-old civil war.”10 
By comparison, the Commander-in-Chief’s assessment was that 
 
Letter.pdf?sid=ST  [hereinafter Letter from Matthew Hoh].  Author’s Note:  In military 
parlance, “ground truth” is an expression that refers to the first-hand experience of the 
reality of a tactical situation, as opposed to a second-hand vicarious experience of 
evaluating what intelligence reports and mission plans assert. 
6 DeYoung, supra note 2. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Letter from Matthew Hoh, supra note 5, at 1. 
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Under the banner of this domestic unity and international 
legitimacy—and only after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama 
bin Laden—we sent our troops into Afghanistan.  Within a matter 
of months, al Qaeda was scattered and many of its operatives were 
killed.  The Taliban was driven from power and pushed back on its 
heels.  A place that had known decades of fear now had reason to 
hope.  At a conference convened by the U.N., a provisional 
government was established under President Hamid Karzai.  And an 
International Security Assistance Force was established to help 
bring a lasting peace to a war-torn country.11 
President Obama acknowledged the declining state of security and 
order in Afghanistan though, further stating that 
Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common 
cause with al Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan 
government.  Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional 
swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly 
brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani 
people.12 
President Obama’s strategy, however is not focused on “cutting 
losses,” but rather increasing them in Afghanistan to combat the 
rising threats to coalitional and Afghan security: 
Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan 
remained a fraction of what they were in Iraq.  When I took office, 
we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan, 
compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war.  Commanders in 
Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the 
reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive.  
And that’s why, shortly after taking office, I approved a 
longstanding request for more troops.  After consultations with our 
allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the fundamental 
connection between our war effort in Afghanistan and the extremist 
safe havens in Pakistan.  I set a goal that was narrowly defined as 
disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist 
allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian 
efforts.13 
Hoh complained that rather than supporting legitimately elected 
governmental officials in Afghanistan, that 
 The United States military presence in Afghanistan greatly 
contributes to the legitimacy and strategic message of the Pashtun 
insurgency.  In a like manner our backing of the Afghan 
government in its current form continues to distance the 
government from the people.  The Afghan government’s failings, 
 
11 Address on Afghanistan, supra note 3. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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particularly when weighed against the sacrifice of American lives 
and dollars, appear legion and metastatic: 
 Glaring corruption and unabashed graft; 
 A President whose confidants and chief advisors comprise drug 
lords and war crimes villains, who mock our own rule of law and 
counternarcotics efforts; 
 A system of provincial and district leaders constituted of local 
power brokers, opportunists and strongmen allied to the United 
States solely for, and limited by, the value of our USAID [US 
Agency for International Development]14 and CERP [Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program]15 contracts and for whose own 
political and economic interests stand nothing to gain from any 
positive or genuine attempts at reconciliation; and 
 The recent election process dominated by fraud and discredited 
by low voter turnout, which has created an enormous victory for our 
enemy who now claims a popular boycott and will call into question 
worldwide our government’s military, economic and diplomatic 
support for an invalid and illegitimate Afghan government.16 
President Obama’s minimal acknowledgement of these problems 
included these non-specific observations alluding to Afghan 
governmental corruption, incompetence, and the Afghan 
government’s ineffectiveness in combating narco-trafficking, if not 
also its complicity with the traffickers: 
[W]hile we’ve achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the 
situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated.  After escaping across the 
border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda’s leadership 
established a safe haven there.  Although a legitimate government 
was elected by the Afghan people, it’s been hampered by 
corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and 
insufficient security forces.17 
And 
 
14 Frequently Asked Questions about USAID and Its Regional Development Mission for 
Asia, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/rdma/about/faq.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (in 
response to the question “What is USAID?”: “an independent agency that provides 
economic, development and humanitarian assistance around the world in support of the 
foreign policy goals of the United States.”). 
15 “CERP originated as a stabilizing tool that commanders could use to benefit the Iraqi 
people.  Initial resources came from millions of dollars of ill-gotten Ba’athist Party cash 
discovered by U.S. forces.  This loot, along with the other regime assets, funded a variety 
of emergency projects.”  Mark S. Martins, The Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program, 37 JOINT FORCES Q. 46, 47 (Second Quarter 2005), http://www.dtic.mil 
/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0937.pdf.  CERP has grown in sourcing for operations, beyond Iraq, 
to include US appropriated projects in Afghanistan as well. 
16 Letter from Matthew Hoh, supra note 5, at 2. 
17 Address on Afghanistan, supra note 3. 
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 The days of providing a blank check are over.  President 
Karzai’s inauguration speech sent the right message about moving 
in a new direction.  And going forward, we will be clear about what 
we expect from those who receive our assistance.  We’ll support 
Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat 
corruption and deliver for the people.  We expect those who are 
ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable.  And we will also 
focus our assistance in areas—such as agriculture—that can make 
an immediate impact in [sic] the lives of the Afghan people.18 
Hoh’s list of grievances meanwhile continues with an allusion to 
history repeating itself.  He comments that we have supported corrupt 
leaders in South Vietnam and in Afghanistan: 
 Our support for this kind of government, coupled with a 
misunderstanding of the insurgency’s true nature, reminds me 
horribly of our involvement with South Vietnam; an unpopular and 
corrupt government we backed at the expense of our Nation’s own 
internal peace, against an insurgency whose nationalism we 
arrogantly and ignorantly mistook as a rival to our own Cold War 
ideology.19 
Mindful of the comparisons that could—and should—be made to 
our involvement in Cold War interventions and present-day 
Afghanistan, President Obama took pains to distinguish present-day 
realities and objectives in Afghanistan from the Vietnam of 35-plus 
years ago: 
 The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades.  
They’ve been confronted with occupation—by the Soviet Union, 
and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for 
their own purposes.  So tonight, I want the Afghan people to 
understand—America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering.  
We have no interest in occupying your country.  We will support 
efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban 
who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow 
citizens.  And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan 
grounded in mutual respect—to isolate those who destroy; to 
strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will 
leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your 
partner, and never your patron.20 
And 
 [T]here are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another 
Vietnam.  They argue that it cannot be stabilized, and we’re better 
off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing.  I believe this 
argument depends on a false reading of history.  Unlike Vietnam, 
 
18 Id. 
19 Letter from Matthew Hoh, supra note 5, at 2. 
20 Address on Afghanistan, supra note 3. 
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we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the 
legitimacy of our action.  Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a 
broad-based popular insurgency.  And most importantly, unlike 
Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from 
Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extremists who are 
plotting along its border.  To abandon this area now—and to rely 
only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance—would 
significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, 
and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our 
homeland and our allies.21 
Hoh believed that our strategy was either a subterfuge for some other 
objective or grossly incompetent, conducting operations in the wrong 
theater: 
I find specious the reasons we ask for bloodshed and sacrifice from 
our young men and women in Afghanistan.  If honest, our stated 
strategy of securing Afghanistan to prevent al-Qaeda resurgence or 
regrouping would require us to additionally invade and occupy 
western Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, etc.  Our presence in 
Afghanistan has only increased destabilization and insurgency in 
Pakistan where we rightly fear a toppled or weakened Pakistani 
government may lose control of its nuclear weapons.  However, 
again, to follow the logic of our stated goals we should garrison 
Pakistan, not Afghanistan.22 
President Obama’s strategy speech recognized a strategic 
partnership with—rather than strategic targeting strategy against—
Pakistan, and acknowledged that we must counter the threats that Hoh 
aptly identifies in Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and elsewhere: 
[W]e will act with the full recognition that our success in 
Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. 
 We’re in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again 
spreading through that country.  But this same cancer has also taken 
root in the border region of Pakistan.  That’s why we need a 
strategy that works on both sides of the border. 
 In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who’ve argued that 
the struggle against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is 
better off doing little or seeking accommodation with those who use 
violence.  But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from 
Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani 
people who are the most endangered by extremism.  Public opinion 
has turned.  The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and 
South Waziristan.  And there is no doubt that the United States and 
Pakistan share a common enemy. 
 
21 Id. 
22 Letter from Matthew Hoh, supra note 5, at 3. 
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 In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan 
narrowly.  Those days are over.  Moving forward, we are committed 
to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual 
interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust.  We will strengthen 
Pakistan’s capacity to target those groups that threaten our 
countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe 
haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions 
are clear.  America is also providing substantial resources to support 
Pakistan’s democracy and development.  We are the largest 
international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the 
fighting.  And going forward, the Pakistan people must know 
America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and 
prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great 
potential of its people can be unleashed.23 
President Obama predicted that “[w]e’ll have to be nimble and precise 
in our use of military power.  Where al Qaeda and its allies attempt to 
establish a foothold—whether in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere—
they must be confronted by growing pressure and strong 
partnerships.”24 
Hoh expresses admiration for the U.S. military capability, but 
bemoans its current mission quagmire, stating that 
 Eight years into war, no nation has ever known a more 
dedicated, well trained, experienced and disciplined military as the 
U.S. Armed Forces.  I do not believe any military force has ever 
been tasked with such a complex, opaque and Sisyphean mission as 
the U.S. military has received in Afghanistan.  The tactical 
proficiency and performance of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and 
Marines is unmatched and unquestioned.  However, this . . . is a war 
for which our leaders, uniformed, civilian and elected, have 
inadequately prepared and resourced our men and women.  Our 
forces, devoted and faithful, have been committed to conflict in an 
indefinite and unplanned manner that has become a cavalier, 
politically expedient and Pollyannaish25 misadventure.  Similarly, 
the United States has a dedicated and talented cadre of civilians, 
both U.S. government employees and contractors, who believe in 
and sacrifice for their mission, but they have been ineffectually 
trained and led with guidance and intent shaped more by the 
 
23 Address on Afghanistan, supra note 3. 
24 Id. 
25 See, e.g., Pollyannaish, URBANDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.urbandictionary.com 
/define.php?term=Pollyannaish (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) (defining “Pollyannaish” as a 
“[b]elittling and often insulting term for being absurdly optimistic and good-hearted, 
believing in a good world where everything works out for the best all tht [sic] time.  Often 
in combination with being God-fearing and perceiving oneself standing on a higher moral 
ground than others.”). 
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political climate in Washington, DC than in Afghan cities, villages, 
mountains and valleys.26 
President Obama recognizes the need to reevaluate the troops-to-
mission mix for operations in Afghanistan, and perhaps even more 
importantly, he recognizes the need for a fresh look at the way ahead 
in both plans and actions on the ground in Afghanistan: 
When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in 
Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war.  
Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal 
with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did 
not arrive.  And that’s why, shortly after taking office, I approved a 
longstanding request for more troops.  After consultations with our 
allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the fundamental 
connection between our war effort in Afghanistan and the extremist 
safe havens in Pakistan.  I set a goal that was narrowly defined as 
disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist 
allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian 
efforts.27 
And 
 As your Commander-in-Chief, I owe you a mission that is 
clearly defined, and worthy of your service.  And that’s why, after 
the Afghan voting was completed, I insisted on a thorough review 
of our strategy.  Now, let me be clear: There has never been an 
option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so 
there has been no delay or denial of resources necessary for the 
conduct of the war during this review period.  Instead, the review 
has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the 
different options, along with my national security team, our military 
and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners.  And 
given the stakes involved, I owed the American people—and our 
troops—no less.28 
Hoh stated the obvious—but overwhelming—reality of the cost of 
overall operations when he quipped that: 
“We are spending ourselves into oblivion” a very talented and 
intelligent commander, one of America’s best, briefs every visitor, 
staff delegation and senior officer.  We are mortgaging our Nation’s 
economy on a war, which, even with increased commitment, will 
remain a draw for years to come.  Success and victory, whatever 
they may be, will be realized not in years, after billions more spent, 
 
26 Letter from Matthew Hoh, supra note 5, at 3. 
27 Address on Afghanistan, supra note 3. 
28 Id. 
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but in decades and generations.  The United States does not enjoy a 
national treasury for such success and victory.29 
President Obama’s accounting in words of the expense in lives and 
dollars is surprisingly similar to Hoh’s assessment, yet different in 
tone: 
 We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in 
lives and resources.  Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have 
left our unity on national security issues in tatters, and created a 
highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort.  And having 
just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great 
Depression, the American people are understandably focused on 
rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home.30 
President Obama focused specifically on the greatest cost to our most 
prized national treasure—our casualties and the impact on their 
families—when he said, 
 Most of all, I know that this decision asks even more of you—a 
military that, along with your families, has already borne the 
heaviest of all burdens.  As President, I have signed a letter of 
condolence to the family of each American who gives their life in 
these wars.  I have read the letters from the parents and spouses of 
those who deployed.  I visited our courageous wounded warriors at 
Walter Reed.  I’ve traveled to Dover to meet the flag-draped caskets 
of 18 Americans returning home to their final resting place.  I see 
firsthand the terrible wages of war.  If I did not think that the 
security of the United States and the safety of the American people 
were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one 
of our troops home tomorrow.31 
As for a “cut our losses” and cut our troop level strategy, President 
Obama countered by saying that 
 [T]here are those who acknowledge that we can’t leave 
Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we go forward with 
the troops that we already have.  But this would simply maintain a 
status quo in which we muddle through, and permit a slow 
deterioration of conditions there.  It would ultimately prove more 
costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never 
be able to generate the conditions needed to train Afghan security 
forces and give them the space to take over.32 
 
29 Letter from Matthew Hoh, supra note 5, at 3. 
30 Address on Afghanistan, supra note 3. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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Announcing his intentions for closure and transition to Afghan 
authorities, President Obama countered unnamed critics when he said 
that 
 Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a time frame for 
our transition to Afghan responsibility.  Indeed, some call for a 
more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort—one 
that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade.  
I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be 
achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to 
secure our interests.  Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for 
transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the 
Afghan government.  It must be clear that Afghans will have to take 
responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in 
fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.33 
Quoting the words of President Eisenhower’s famous Military-
Industrial Complex farewell address, that “each proposal must be 
weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain 
balance in and among national programs,”34 President Obama 
reflected that 
 Over the past several years, we have lost that balance.  We’ve 
failed to appreciate the connection between our national security 
and our economy.  In the wake of an economic crisis, too many of 
our neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the 
bills.  Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our 
children.  Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has 
grown more fierce.  So we can’t simply afford to ignore the price of 
these wars. 
 All told, by the time I took office the cost of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan approached a trillion dollars.  Going forward, I am 
committed to addressing these costs openly and honestly.  Our new 
approach in Afghanistan is likely to cost us roughly $30 billion for 
the military this year, and I’ll work closely with Congress to address 
these costs as we work to bring down our deficit.35 
Hoh concluded his resignation letter with a succinct and cynical note: 
 Thousands of our men and women have returned home with 
physical and mental wounds some that will never heal or will only 
worsen with time.  The dead return only in bodily form to be 
received by families who must be reassured their dead have 
sacrificed for a purpose worthy of futures lost, love vanished, and 
 
33 Id. 
34 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address (Jan. 17, 1961) (transcript available online 
at www.millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3361). 
35 Address on Afghanistan, supra note 3. 
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promised dreams unkept.  I have lost confidence such assurances 
can anymore be made.  As such, I submit my resignation.36 
President Obama, instead, called for Americans to come together for a 
common cause, recalling the origins of the current conflicts, and he 
called for them to generate renewed hope for the future: 
 It’s easy to forget that when this war began, we were united—
bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the 
determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear.  
I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity 
again.  I believe with every fiber of my being that we—as 
Americans—can still come together behind a common purpose.  For 
our values are not simply words written into parchment—they are a 
creed that calls us together, and that has carried us through the 
darkest of storms as one nation, as one people. 
 America—we are passing through a time of great trial.  And the 
message that we send in the midst of these storms must be clear: 
that our cause is just, our resolve unwavering.  We will go forward 
with the confidence that right makes might, and with the 
commitment to forge an America that is safer, a world that is more 
secure, and a future that represents not the deepest of fears but the 
highest of hopes.37 
II 
PAST IN PANAMA AS PROLOGUE IN AFGHANISTAN, OR AFGHAN 
APPLES TO PANAMANIAN ORANGES?38 
These are the three core elements of our strategy [in Afghanistan]: a 
military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian 
surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership 
with Pakistan. 
–President Barack H. Obama to U.S. Corps of Cadets 
December 1, 200939 
This final section of this paper will explore how the Obama 
administration’s Afghanistan strategy has embraced—at least in 
principle—the requisite strategic principles that made Operations Just 
Cause, and the “follow-on” (subsequent) civil- military Promote 
Liberty operations in Panama, successful.  Our intervention in 
 
36 Letter from Matthew Hoh, supra note 5, at 4. 
37 Address on Afghanistan, supra note 3. 
38 See Kevin H. Govern, Guest commentary: Lessons from Panama apply to 
Afghanistan , NAPLES DAILY NEWS, (Naples, FL), Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.naplesnews 
.com/news/2009/dec/17/lessons-panama-apply-afghanistan, for a discussion of the idea 
that the U.S. should apply its experiences intervening in Panama after the Cold War to its 
current interventions in Afghanistan after 9/11.  The comments and observations made in 
this article are solely those of the author, unless otherwise stated or cited within. 
39 Address on Afghanistan, supra note 3. 
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Panama more than two decades ago was, to a great extent, successful 
not only because of our impressive application of military force, but 
because we had effective civil-military operations and public-private 
resourcing working to shape government and society in a way to best 
serve the Panamanian people and promote national, regional and 
international security.40  As time shows, however, the failure by our 
government to support and sustain anti-corruption measures can and 
will undo efforts to establish and promote the rule of law through a 
law of rules.41 
There are obvious differences between the Panama of the 1980s 
and Afghanistan of today.  In a previous comparison of those two 
nations, I noted that: 
 Panama, for instance, was and is a tropical nation of 3 million 
inhabitants on a landmass smaller than South Carolina.42  
Afghanistan is a nation of 29 million across a varied terrain the size 
of Texas.43  Neither nation shares a border with each other, or with 
the US, or even a common language, ethnic composition, or 
historical heritage.44 
The bases for our intervention in both nations are dramatically 
different as well.  President George H. W. Bush ordered our 
December 20, 1989, intervention in Panama to protect U.S. lives and 
property, to fulfill U.S. treaty responsibilities to operate and defend 
the Canal, to assist the Panamanian people in restoring democracy, 
and to bring General Noriega to justice.  The legal, judicial, and penal 
systems during the Noriega regime were badly corrupted and, more 
often than not, political control rather than justice prevailed.45 
In Afghanistan, the autocratic Taliban government refused to expel 
al Qaeda and its leader bin Laden, or end its support for international 
terrorism.  My public comparisons follow regarding aspirational 
versus actual military objectives in Afghanistan and Panama: 
 The US and its coalition partners commenced military 
operations on October 7, 2001 to target terrorist facilities and 
various Taliban military and political assets within Afghanistan, and 
to aid a democratically elected government in securing its borders, 
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maintain[ing] internal order and establish[ing] conditions of peace 
and prosperity for the Afghan people. 
 In Panama, as in Afghanistan, military forces accomplished their 
primary objectives relatively quickly.  Winning—and sustaining—
the peace, however, has proved to be a larger challenge in both 
nations.46 
What made the Panama intervention a long-term investment in 
success—and what will make operations in Afghanistan successful—
is worth noting here. 
 For Panama, the [Commander-in-Chief] gave clear guidance on 
objectives to be accomplished.  Although not revealed in full 
through the media, our military and civilian leaders responsible for 
operations in Afghanistan now have the clear . . . guidance they 
require.  Next, those involved in Panama operations were allowed to 
prepare and execute a plan in detail to accomplish those objectives. 
 This is also occurring with our ongoing operations in 
Afghanistan.  Forces in Panama were allowed sufficient time and 
resources to accomplish their objectives, and to execute their 
mission without substantial changes to their plans.  Congress, as the 
voice of the American people, needs to allow this to take place in 
Afghanistan.47 
The success of the civil-military mission in Panama would 
“eventually involve political, diplomatic, economic and informational 
measures to supplement military efforts[,]” since “creating a credible 
internal security force was also a task that could not be achieved 
overnight.”48  Only the military had the necessary capabilities to fill 
the initial security gap and to field the new police force free of 
corruption.  This was a “near impossible task that would take years,” 
and still proves to be a problem today.49 
In Panama, as has been the case in Afghanistan, interagency civil-
military operations have been critical in establishing and maintaining 
a law of rules and a rule of laws, and fostering economic growth, 
political transparency, cooperative diplomacy, and effective security.  
In post-Just Cause Panama, the democratically elected coalition 
government weakened with time and Noriega’s cronies briefly 
assumed power.  The lack of planning for the execution of the 
intervention operations, the complexity of the Panamanian problem, 
and the ambiguous political objectives led to the slow start of 
 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 William J. Conley Jr., Operations “Just Cause” and “Promote Liberty”: The 
Implications of Military Operations Other Than War 40 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/conley.pdf. 
49 Id. 
2011] Resigned to Failure or Committed to 175 
a Just Cause of Justice? 
Promote Liberty.50  “In time, the Panamanian people, with the aid of 
U.S. and international agencies, restored representative democracy 
with effective branches of government.”51  In Panama, anti-corruption 
efforts grew from the synergy generated by leaders from government, 
civil society, labor organizations, and the clergy.  As Panama grew 
more capable to provide for its own national security, battling illegal 
domestic and international narcotics and arms trade, U.S. and regional 
security benefited as a result.  Such efforts were not self-sustaining, 
however; in late-2010, the Panamanian branch of Transparency 
International assessed that Panama was failing to combat corruption 
regarding conflicts of interest, nepotism, lack of compliance with 
international anti-corruption measures, and pressure exerted on media 
and anti-corruption activists.52 
So, too, in Afghanistan, political, tribal, industrial and clerical 
leaders must work in concert with U.S. and international agencies to 
challenge the apparent resurgence of the Taliban in tribal areas.  They 
must also meet concerns about central government corruption with 
concerted efforts towards political integrity and honesty.  Mutual 
benefits in Central Asia and in the United States will accrue from 
Afghanistan’s counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics efforts.53 
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CONCLUSION 
HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF—OR WRITING THE PRESENT TO 
AVOID REPETITION IN THE FUTURE? 
The American philosopher George Santayana (1863–1952) 
cautioned in Life of Reason, Volume I, that “[t]hose who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”54 Afghanistan has 
long been called the “graveyard of empires,” given the failed 
incursions of Alexander the Great, the Persians, Genghis Khan, the 
British Empire (twice), and the former Soviet Union.55  This Article 
has looked back at Matthew Hoh’s first-hand (“ground truth”) 
observations, his rationale for resignation, and President Obama’s 
refocused strategy in Afghanistan.  Leaders in the U.S. Congress, the 
White House, the Pentagon, and academia alike would do well to 
study these past failures as negative exemplars of what not to emulate.  
By way of comparison, the Just Cause/Promote Liberty mixed-
success operations may prove to be small-scale exemplars of what to 
emulate in post-conflict civil military operations.  Such retrospection 
can and should help us appreciate and implement what we can and 
should accomplish with and on behalf of other nations in the quest for 
peace, stability, and security in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
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